If the Internet reduces certain mechanical transaction costs, it also often reveals less-obvious underlying frictions. In the specific case of labor markets, the relative lack of personal, specific interactions might make it difficult for employers to extract "high-bandwidth" information (Autor, 2001 ) to infer the "type" of a given worker. Furthermore, the increased heterogeneity of applicants make comparisons among them more challenging; for instance, comparing seemingly similar school degrees or job experiences of applicants from different countries may not be straightforward.
In addition to hidden-quality problems, an obvious issue for prospective employers is the difficulty in monitoring and verifying effort from a distance and through an Internet-mediated transaction.
Market-making platforms
Virtual marketplaces have developed online in order to facilitate the meeting of demand and supply. Four of the largest online contract labor markets are oDesk, Elance, Freelancer, and Guru. Elance and Guru were both launched in 1999, followed by oDesk in 2005 and Freelancer in 2009. These sites are similar in that they allow employers to find and hire short-term workers by registering on the platform and posting jobs to attract applicants. Similarly, they all allow registered contract workers from around the world to apply for jobs posted on the sites by bidding on them and to advertise themselves to employers with profile pages. These platforms earn revenue by charging a percentage of each transaction or member fees to workers and, in some cases, both. In addition to providing a (virtual) place for demand and supply to meet and for the market to clear, these platforms have evolved over time toward addressing some of the key challenges of labor markets in general and online markets in particular.
As mentioned above, a key challenge in online contract labor transactions is given by the limited access to specific or "high-bandwidth" information about both applicants and employers.
Online contract labor platforms are increasingly providing features that attempt to solve these information problems. First, platforms provide a verification and standardization device for some of this information; for example, although "offline" work experiences and educational attainments cannot be easily compared across individuals, especially if they come from very different institutional and cultural contexts, employers can more easily compare work experience accumulated by service suppliers on the platform (i.e., the number of jobs, duration, types, as well as performance as expressed by the rating given by the employers and workers). This information is available in online contract labor markets on contractor profiles, and platforms generally do not allow contractors to delete or block this information from their profiles, thus reducing selectivity issues and increasing the reliability of these signals. Platforms also offer the possibility for applicants to perform standardized tests that offer some easy-to-assess quality measures for prospective employers. Moreover, some platforms support contractor agencies or companies. Contractors in an agency can cooperate to apply for and complete jobs on the site. Some evidence illustrates that these groups help reduce information asymmetries (Stanton & Thomas, 2012) .
In addition to providing quality information, online contract labor platforms also help solve challenges relative to the observability and verifiability of effort, on both the worker's and employer's sides, through various mechanisms. Direct monitoring is available on some platforms through virtual office applications.
2 Contractors who perform their work while logged into these virtual offices are monitored through regular screen shots and activity logs. To provide incentives for contractors to accept this degree of monitoring, some platforms guarantee contractor payment for hourly wage work only if it is performed while logged into the virtual office. Along with direct monitoring, workers' ratings represent a potentially powerful reputational mechanism for aligning their objectives with employer objectives.
Likewise, moral hazard issues can arise on the part of employers. For example, employers could refuse to pay for work performed outside virtual offices or to reimburse expenses.
However, contract workers can rate their experience with an employer on most platforms, thus allaying concerns about the risk of exploitative behavior and reneging on previous agreements.
Furthermore, both employers and contractors can file disputes if they feel they've been unjustly charged or paid. Platforms act as mediators in these disputes and ultimately decide how they should be resolved.
Work Process on oDesk
Further details on the working of our platform of reference, oDesk, illustrate the operating of online contract labor markets in particular, the specific challenges and opportunities associated with them, and how they are dealt with and leveraged.
To post jobs on oDesk, employers have to register on the site by giving their contact details and information on their company, including name, owner, and location. Once registered, employers are free to post as many jobs as they like. Job postings include a description of the task, the location of the employer, and the type of contract being offered. oDesk supports two 2 Evidence shows that strict monitoring is important for the success of working from home. Bloom et al. (2013) study a Chinese travel agency that decided to try having some employees work from home. The study finds significant gains from working from home in terms of worker productivity and satisfaction. This may be partially a result of the firm's careful monitoring of telecommuting workers. Dutcher & Saral (2012) highlight the difficulties that may arise if telecommuting workers are not properly monitored by showing experimental evidence that nontelecommuting workers perceive that their telecommuting counterparts are shirkers.
contract types -hourly wage and fixed price. Beyond the different payment structures, the contracts have different implications for monitoring and duration specifications. Specifically, when posting an hourly-wage job, employers have to specify the expected number of hours per week and the number of weeks required to complete the job. They can also stipulate a limit on the number of hours per week a contractor can work. When posting a fixed-price job, employers have to specify the budget and deadline . Employers can make job postings public (so that any contractor can apply to them) or private (so that only contractors they invite can apply to them).
To be hired on oDesk, workers similarly must register on the site by giving their contact details, name, and location as well as by setting up a profile page. Profile pages are meant to advertise contractors to potential employers and can include a description of skills, education, work experience outside of oDesk, oDesk-administered test scores, certifications, whether or not they belong to an agency, and oDesk-specific work histories and feedback scores. Once they have set up their profile pages, contractors can apply to jobs by submitting cover letters and bids to job postings. A bid indicates the amount a contractor is willing to be paid to work on a job.
Employers have the option to interview and negotiate over bids with applicants before hiring and to hire as many contractors as they like. Once hired, contractors complete tasks remotely.
Contractors submit their work to employers online and are paid via oDesk. Employers have the option to give contractors bonuses and can reimburse expenses through oDesk, too.
After each job, employers give contractors a rating out of five based on six criteria: skills, quality, availability, deadlines, communication, and cooperation. Each contractor also has an overall feedback score, which is a job-size-weighted average of the individual scores.
Contractors can provide their employers feedback scores based on the same criteria; employers have a similarly constructed overall score. oDesk does all this in exchange for 10% of every transaction made on the site.
The other major platforms in the industry share several features with oDesk; however, they have their differences. The primary variations lie in the services they provide participants. For instance, some sites support contractor employment agencies and some do not, some offer guaranteed payment for hourly wage contracts and some do not, and Freelancer does not have a virtual office while the other three sites do.
Perhaps the most significant difference between the sites is that Freelancer supports both traditional hiring and crowdsourcing whereas the rest do not support the latter. Given that crowdsourcing likely has different implications for matching and production, findings from research on oDesk may not generalize to crowdsourcing sites.
The effects of digitization on labor markets and organization
There are two immediate consequences to the reduction in the cost of distance for online labor markets. First, the pool of both prospective workers and employers increases dramatically, and second, jobs or specific tasks can be performed at large distances from employers. In this section, we discuss the implication and challenges of these important changes.
Matching made easier?
The ease of access to online contract labor markets, thanks to the development of platforms such as oDesk, Freelancer, Elance, and Guru, has the potential to considerably increase the pool of both job seekers and employers and to reduce search costs. Matching models, particularly as applied to labor markets, predict that this will lead to efficiency gains thanks to lower search costs and a lower likelihood of mismatches (Petrongolo & Pissarides, 2001; Wheeler, 2001 ).
However, opposite forces are also at play in these markets. Just like information technologies reduce the role of distance for search and execution of work, they also lead to a more heterogeneous pool of both workers and employers. In addition, the absence of personal interactions typical of offline and more localized labor markets precludes access to "soft" or "high-bandwidth" information about both job seekers and prospective employers (Autor, 2001 ).
This introduces uncertainty that in turn may lead to an overall reduction in the quality of workers (Akerlof, 1970) and/or to search frictions (Stigler, 1962) . These search frictions could be exacerbated if quality is difficult to determine (Wilde, 1981) , which is quite possible in these markets because of the diverse labor pool.
Although theories of search and matching specific to online labor markets have not been developed, a growing body of evidence points to the presence of these informational problems and the ways in which they are addressed in online contract labor platforms. A common pattern to a number of these studies is to look at the presence of preferences for certain geographic locations of workers as a way to alleviate uncertainty about workers' quality. Mill (2012), for example, finds that once an employer on Freelancer has a good experience with a contractor from a particular country, the employer is more likely to hire someone else from that same which skills to learn. Such decisions are made a small number of times by relatively uninformed individuals who receive one-time feedback about their choices.
In traditional markets, decisions about human capital investments are difficult to observe. In online labor markets, these choices are more visible and measurable. On platforms like oDesk, an enormous amount of information illustrates which skills tend to go together, the wages associated with those skills, and even common career trajectories, allowing recommender systems to distill which skills to learn and then learn how they perform via experimentation.
A fourth interesting market-design feature of these platforms is the creation of submarkets and categories that are often defined through some combination of geography and time to coordinate activities and thus create a sufficiently thick market (e.g., the creation of industrial districts for specific sectors). The platform must attempt to define at some level of detail the various services being offered and then organize the market accordingly. In the language of machine learning, there is both a "clustering task"(finding the meaningful groups of jobs/contractors based on historical data)and a "labeling task" (being able to assign a new job to one of the identified clusters based on that job's attributes).
Conclusion
We identify three broad lines of inquiry as central to the digitization research agenda. All three focus on the effect of digitizing the market for contract labor. The first concerns welfare effects, the second distribution effects, and the third user behaviour effects. All three are set in the context of the market for contract labor but have broader implications for digitization in other settings.
Access to data will pose a challenge to fully addressing these questions. In contrast to data from online platforms that collect information on hiring (as well as pre-and post-hiring)
transactions at a granular level and at low cost, it is costly to obtain even a basic level of offline contracting data. Yet, to fully address the first two lines of inquiry outlined above, offline data is required to estimate the causal effect of digitization on changes in welfare and distributional properties (geography, income, firm boundaries). This is likely why most of the first wave of studies concerning the digitization of this market focuses on market design related subjects (e.g., experience, agencies, ratings) since these questions only require observing within-platform variation in user behaviour and do not require linking these data to non-platform-participants.
While the third line of inquiry, market design and user behaviour, is largely spared from the requirement to link with offline data, the greatest challenge to this research in the short and medium term will likely be the rapid evolution of the industry. As illustrated above, the industry is growing at an exponential rate. In addition, complementary technologies, such as those associated with mobile and social, are changing rapidly. As such, market design features that seem salient today may be less relevant relative to other features in the future. For example, monitoring technologies such as work rooms with screen shots was only recently introduced and is already standard practise across many platforms and likely to be replaced soon with streaming screen video. While the ultimate goal of research of this type is obtaining a deeper understanding of human behaviour rather than of a particular market design feature, the economic salience of the feature is often important for generalizability and yet may be fleeting due to the rapid pace of change in this setting.
Whereas the former two lines of inquiry are most likely to be led by scholars and policy makers, the latter will almost surely include important contributions from industry since this issue is of first order importance for product development and competition. This has already been the case with oDesk (Horton, 2010; 2012) as well as with other market design issues on platforms such as Google (Varian, 2007; Choi & Varian, 2012) , eBay (Blake et al, 2013) , and
Yahoo (Lewis et al, 2009; Ghosh & McAfee, 2011) . Industry interest coupled with their access to high quality data may significantly accelerate progress on this research frontier. At the same time, the competitive implications of market design insights may inhibit the dissemination of this type of research and thus the overall impact of industry interest in this subject on the rate and direction of progress on this part of the agenda is ambiguous.
Given the role that platforms play as the central collectors of data in these markets, they will influence the direction of research on all three lines if inquiry through the decisions they make with regards to providing researchers with access to their data. Early signs are promising for the research community since many of the most prominent platforms have established "Chief Economists" or similar types of research-friendly leadership positions and encourage employees to participate in the scholarly community by publishing their research and participating at conferences and other scholarly events.
Given the rapid growth rate of the online market for contract labor, this research agenda is economically important. The first line of inquiry will help us better understand the potential welfare benefits due to digitization in this sector of the economy. The second will shed light on how these benefits may be distributed across countries and individuals and their impact on the structure of the firm. The third will provide us with further insight into human behaviour in the digital world as we explore user reactions to market design features, many of which are widely used in many sectors outside of just contract employment. Overall, these insights will be of great interest to scholars, policy-makers, and industry participants alike. 
